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Abstract 
 The problems faced by debtors in South Africa is not that there 
are no alternatives to insolvency proceedings, but that the 
available alternatives do not provide for a discharge of debt as 
with a sequestration order, which is ultimately what the debtor 
seeks to achieve. Debtors in South Africa can make use of debt 
review in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 or 
administration orders in terms of the Magistrates' Court Act 32 
of 1944 to circumvent the sequestration process. However, both 
debt review and administration orders do not provide for a 
discharge of debt and provide for debt-restructuring only, in 
order to eventually satisfy the creditor's claims. Attention is given 
to the sequestration process and the alternatives to 
sequestration as they relate specifically to the discharge or lack 
of a discharge of a debtor's debts. The South African law is 
compared to Kenyan Law. This article seeks to analyse the 
alternatives to the bankruptcy provisions of the newly enacted 
Kenyan Insolvency Act 18 of 2015 in order to influence the 
possible reform of insolvency law in South Africa. Like the South 
African Insolvency Act, the old Kenyan Bankruptcy Act (Cap 53 
of the Laws of Kenya) also did not have alternatives to 
bankruptcy. The old Kenyan Bankruptcy Act, however, 
contained a provision on schemes of arrangement and 
compositions. The Kenyan Insolvency Act now caters for 
alternatives to bankruptcy and provides a wide range of 
alternatives to bankruptcy, some of which allow debtors in 
different financial positions to obtain a discharge.  
Keywords 
Kenya; bankruptcy; insolvency law; alternatives to bankruptcy; 
alternatives to sequestration, debt review, administration orders, 
debt intervention.  
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1 Introduction 
A problem faced by over-indebted individual debtors in South Africa is not 
that there are no alternatives to the sequestration proceedings, but rather 
that the available alternatives do not provide for a discharge of debt, which 
is one of the objectives the debtor seeks to achieve. The World Bank Report 
mentions that one of the principal purposes of an insolvency system 
for natural persons is to re-establish the debtor's economic capability 
through a discharge of debts.1 In South Africa, an insolvent is automatically 
rehabilitated and discharged from debts after the expiry of a period of 10 
years from the date of sequestration.2 As the discharge of debts in South 
Africa occurs only after a fairly long period of time, there is a dire need for 
alternative legislative interventions that would also allow debtors in different 
financial positions to obtain a discharge of debts. To achieve this goal many 
countries have developed alternatives to bankruptcy,3 which either reduce 
the period of bankruptcy4 or provide a discharge of debt without 
experiencing all the limiting consequences of bankruptcy.5 In Kenya the 
                                            
⃰ Zingapi Mabe. LLB LLM (University of Pretoria). Senior Lecturer, University of South 
Africa. E-mail: mabez@unisa.ac.za. The author would like to acknowledge the 
financial assistance provided by Unisa's College of Law Research and Innovation 
Committee (CRIC) during the research for and writing of this article, including a grant 
to attend and deliver a paper (on which this article is based) at the Insol International 
Academics Colloquium held in London, United Kingdom on 11-13 July 2018. 
However, the views and conclusions contained in this article are the author's and the 
author absolves Unisa's College of Law from any responsibility that may arise 
therefrom. The author further wishes to express her thanks to Professor Michel Kelly-
Louw for her valuable insights and comments, which improved the article. 
1  World Bank Report paras 359-360. 
2  An insolvent may also apply to court for his rehabilitation after the expiry of certain 
periods after sequestration. See ss 124(1)-124(5), 127A of the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936 (hereafter the Insolvency Act); Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 14.2; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars para 25.1. 
3  The United Kingdom is pro-debtor and this can be seen in the one year automatic 
discharge period and the provision of individual voluntary agreements (IVA) and debt 
relief order (DRO), both of which provide for earlier discharge periods. See Part VIII 
and Part 7A of the United Kingdom's Insolvency Act, 1986 (hereafter the UK's 
Insolvency Act); Walters 2009 IIR 5; Fletcher Law of Insolvency. Australia has 
personal insolvency agreements (PIA) under Part X of the Australian Bankruptcy 
Act, 1966 (hereafter the Australian Bankruptcy Act) and debt agreements (DA) under 
Part IX of the same Act. The Australian Bankruptcy Act was recently amended by 
the Insolvency Law Report Act, 2016 (hereafter the ILRA). The ILRA came into force 
on 29 February 2016 and commenced on 1 March 2017. The aim of the ILRA is to 
amend the law relating to personal and corporate insolvency and for related 
purposes, more especially to amend the Bankruptcy Act, 1966, the Bankruptcy 
(Estate Charges) Act, 1997 and the Corporations Act, 2001. 
4  In this article the terms bankruptcy, bankruptcy procedure and sequestration process 
are considered as synonyms and are used interchangeably. 
5  A sequestration order diminishes an insolvent's legal capacity, his capacity to 
contract, his  capacity to litigate and his capacity to earn a living and to hold certain 
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alternatives to the bankruptcy provisions are contained in section 14 of the 
Kenyan Insolvency Act.6 The new Act came into force in 2015 and it 
repealed the old Bankruptcy Act7 and the old Companies Act.8 
The legislative mechanisms available to over-indebted debtors in South 
Africa are:9 sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act; administration 
orders provided for in section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act;10 and the 
debt review process provided for in terms of the National Credit Act.11 
Administration orders and debt review have been classified as true debt-
relief mechanisms, while sequestration, accurately speaking, is not 
intended to be a debt-relief mechanism available to over-indebted individual 
debtors, although it has the same end result and serves the same 
purpose.12 The Insolvency Act provides for a legislative process by which 
the assets of the debtor are distributed amongst his creditors. One of the 
consequences of a debtor's estate’s being sequestrated is that it provides 
for a discharge of the debtor's debts. In contrast, debt review and 
administration orders are more focussed on bringing relief to the debtor 
regarding his debts than on providing him with a discharge of his debts. 
Although the Draft National Credit Amendment Bill will not be discussed in 
detail in this article, it is important to mention that it introduces debt 
intervention in clause 14.13 The debt intervention in clause 14 extinguishes 
part or all of the obligations for a certain class of debtors.14 Certain debtors 
may also apply for rehabilitation.15 However the debt intervention will be 
applicable only to debts of not more than R50 000 and which arose as a 
result of credit agreements. 
This article investigates whether the current alternatives to the 
sequestration process allow debtors in different financial positions to obtain 
                                            
offices. See Ex parte Taljaard 1975 3 SA 106 (O) 108; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v 
Essop 1997 4 SA 569 (D) 575; Boezaart Law of Persons 144ff; Sharrock, Van der 
Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law 57; Smith Law of Insolvency 100. 
6  Insolvency Act 18 of 2015 (hereafter the Kenyan Insolvency Act or new Act). 
7  Bankruptcy Act (Cap 53 of the Laws of Kenya) (hereafter the old Bankruptcy Act). 
8  Companies Act (Cap 486 of the Laws of Kenya) (hereafter the old Companies Act). 
9  For a detailed discussion of the workings, benefits and disadvantages of the different 
mechanisms, see Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms; Coetzee 2017 
THRHR 20; Coetzee 2016 IIR 36-39. 
10  Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 (hereafter the MCA). 
11  National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter the NCA).  
12  Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms 3. 
13  See clause 14 of the Draft National Credit Amendment Bill, 2018 (hereafter the Draft 
Bill) which is added to Chapter 4 after Part D of the NCA. 
14  See the added s 88C(4) under clause 14 of the Draft Bill. 
15  See the added s 88E under clause 14 of the Draft Bill. 
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a formal discharge of their debts. In order to achieve this, I will consider the 
current alternatives to the sequestration process available for natural person 
debtors in South Africa, namely administration orders and debt review. 
There is no intention to discuss these alternative debt relief mechanisms in 
any specific detail. A legal comparative investigation is done with Kenyan 
law, with the aim of making recommendations for law reform in South Africa 
regarding alternatives to sequestration that will allow debtors in different 
financial positions to obtain a discharge of debts in South Africa.  
The inclusion of Kenyan law was based on my desire to choose a country 
with a mixed legal system similar to that of South Africa and a country that 
shares similar legal origins to South Africa, which has already reformed its 
insolvency legislation. Kenya has a common law background with an 
English influence, its insolvency legislation borrowed extensively from the 
UK's Insolvency Act, and its insolvency law was consolidated into a single 
Act in 2015. Kenya' newly enacted Insolvency Act contains a wide range of 
alternatives to bankruptcy, which at face value appear to achieve the 
purpose of legislative interventions that allow debtors in different financial 
positions to obtain a discharge.  
2 South African sequestration process 
It is important to mention that sequestration may not be the inevitable result 
for every over-indebted debtor who becomes insolvent. A sequestration 
order in South Africa in terms of the Insolvency Act may either be obtained 
by the debtor’s voluntarily surrendering his insolvent estate or a creditor of 
the debtor’s applying for the sequestration of the debtor's insolvent estate. 
In either case, a sequestration order in South Africa will not be granted 
unless it is shown that the sequestration will be to the advantage of the 
creditors of the debtor.16 This requirement has shown to be the most difficult 
to prove, more so in voluntary surrender applications.17 When applying for 
a voluntary surrender of his estate, a debtor has to show that he has enough 
assets that can be realised to pay for the costs of sequestration and, most 
importantly, that the sequestration will be to the benefit of creditors (eg, all 
the creditors will receive a dividend).18 In contrast, for the compulsory 
sequestration of a debtor's estate brought by a creditor of a debtor, the 
                                            
16  Bertelsmann et al Mars paras 3.30, 5.35. 
17  Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms 3, 11; Coetzee 2016 IIR 36-39. 
18  Section 6(1) of the Insolvency Act; Ex parte Arntzen (Nedbank Ltd as Intervening 
Creditor) 2013 1 SA 49 (KZP) 50 (hereafter Ex parte Arntzen); Roestoff Kritiese 
Evaluasie van Skuldverligtingsmaatreels 343. See Bertelsmann et al Mars para 3.30 
for a discussion of the concept "advantage of creditors" in relation to voluntary 
surrenders. 
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creditor needs to prove only that there is reason to believe that it will be to 
the advantage of the debtor's creditors if the debtor's estate is 
sequestrated.19  
As indicated, one of the consequences of a debtor's estate’s being 
sequestrated is that it provides for a discharge of the debts upon 
rehabilitation.20 The discharge can happen automatically after 10 years or 
earlier on application by the insolvent debtor.21 As a result, over-indebted 
and desperate debtors have in the past used somewhat fraudulent means 
to access the sequestration process22 and to eventually obtain a discharge 
of their debts upon rehabilitation.23  
The advantage requirement of the sequestration process prevents those 
debtors who want to access the sequestration process only to obtain a 
discharge from their debts.24 However, because the discharge of debts in 
South Africa occurs only after a fairly long period of time, there is a dire need 
for alternative legislative interventions that would also allow debtors in 
different financial positions to obtain a discharge of their debts. 
3 South African debt-relief measures outside of the 
sequestration process 
Outside the sequestration process, if creditors have not commenced the 
individual debt collection process to recover their debts,25 over-indebted 
debtors may make an application to a debt counsellor to be declared over-
                                            
19  Mabe and Evans 2014 SA Merc LJ 656; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's 
Insolvency Law 33. 
20  Bertelsmann et al Mars 555; Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms para 5.6. 
21  See s 127A of the Insolvency Act; Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 14.2; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars para 25.1. 
22  See Mabe 2017 THRHR 695, where Mabe explains how a debtor in Nedbank Limited 
v Malan; In re: Ex parte Application of Malan 2015 JOL 33458 (GP) used the process 
of voluntary surrender in s 4(1) of the Insolvency Act to activate the suspension of 
sales in execution in s 5(1) of the Insolvency Act; Mabe and Evans 2014 SA Merc 
LJ 651, where various fraudulent actions are taken by debtors and creditors to 
access the sequestration process are explained. 
23  See amongst other cases Nedbank Limited v Malan; In re: Ex parte Application of 
Malan 2015 JOL 33458 (GP); Ex parte Erasmus 2015 1 SA 540 (GP); Nedbank 
Limited v Spencer 2015 ZAGPPHC 172 (3 March 2015); FirstRand Bank v 
Consumer Guardian 2014 ZAWCHC 27 (4 March 2014); Crafford v Crafford 2014 
ZAWCHC 14 (13 February 2014); Ex parte Snooke 2014 5 SA 426 (FB); Ex parte 
Arntzen; Plumb on Plumbers v Lauderdale 2013 1 SA 60 (KZD); Ex parte Mark 
Shmukler-Tshiko and Emma Shmukler-Tshiko 2012 ZAGPJHC 209 (26 October 
2012). 
24  Bertelsmann et al Mars 74; Mabe 2017 THRHR 695. 
25  Section 65 of the MCA; s 86 of the NCA; Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 
2011 3 SA 581 (SCA); Otto National Credit Act Explained para 30.9(c). 
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indebted in terms of the debt review procedure in section 86 of the NCA26 
or they may apply for an administration order in terms of section 74 of the 
MCA. The debt review procedure is designed to assist over-indebted 
debtors by re-arranging their financial obligations under a credit agreement, 
with the objective of eventually settling the debt.27 Administration orders too 
are aimed at assisting over-indebted debtors by re-arranging their financial 
obligations, with the objective that the debtors' debt will ultimately be settled 
in full.28 
Although debt review in terms of the NCA has no monetary limitation on the 
total outstanding debt, it applies only to debts that arose from credit 
agreements as defined by the NCA.29 A consumer who wishes to 
commence the debt review process must pay amongst other costs an 
application fee,30 a rejection fee if the application is rejected,31 and a 
restructuring fee less than or equal to the first instalment of the debt re-
arrangement plan.32 Once the debt review process is complete, a debt 
counsellor may recommend a magistrates' court order re-arranging the 
debtor's obligations.33 A debt review order will be granted only if it is believed 
that the debtor's financial affairs can be successfully re-arranged (eg, where 
the debtor receives a regular income or has assets to realise).34 If the court 
grants the order, the debtor will generally make monthly payments to a 
payment distribution agent35 that will distribute the amount among the credit 
providers. Debt counselling does not extinguish a credit provider's claim 
against a debtor but merely delays its enforcement36 and regulates the way 
and extent of the debtor's payments to creditors.37 During debt counselling 
                                            
26  For a detailed discussion of debt review, see Kelly-Louw and Stoop Consumer Credit 
Regulation para 12.3; Scholtz et al Guide to the National Credit Act paras 11.3-11.4. 
27  Kelly-Louw and Stoop Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa 324. 
28  Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms fn 81, 21. 
29  Section 4 read with s 8 of the NCA; Roestoff and Coetzee 2012 SA Merc LJ 68. 
30  Section 86(3)(a), 86(4) of the NCA read with Schedule 2(2) of the National Credit 
Regulations, 2006 (NCA Regulations), Circular 6 of 2017 Interpretation of Section 
71 of the NCA paras 1-6. See NCR 2018 http://www.ncr.org.za. The application fee 
currently set at R50 plus VAT. 
31  The rejection fee is R300 excluding VAT. 
32  The restructuring fee may not be more than R6 000. Other costs include a maximum 
fee of R6 000 excluding VAT for joint applications, a monthly aftercare fee of 5% 
excluding VAT of the debt rearrangement instalment and a consent order fee of 
R750. See NCR 2011 http://www.ncr.org.za/pdfs/Guidelines/2011/ 
Debt_Counselling_Fee_Guidelines.pdf. 
33  Section 86(7)(c)(ii)(aa)-86(7)(c)(ii)(dd) for the methods of restructuring allowed by 
the NCA. 
34  Sections 85-88 of the NCA; Van Heerden and Lötz 2010 THRHR 516. 
35  Section 44A of the NCA. 
36  Section 88(3) of the NCA; Otto National Credit Act Explained para 30.9(b). 
37  Ex parte Ford 2009 3 SA 376 (WCC) 383. 
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a debtor is prohibited from obtaining any new credit, except as provided for 
in the NCA.38 An application for debt review does not constitute an act of 
insolvency in terms of the Insolvency Act,39 but it also does not per se 
preclude an application for sequestration.40  
A consumer whose debts have been rearranged can be issued with a 
clearance certificate which will end his debt review but will not discharge his 
debts.41 A debtor can therefore be issued with a clearance certificate even 
if all his obligations under all the credit agreement that were subject to the 
debt re-arrangement have not been satisfied.42 This is in contrast to an 
administration order, where the debtor could remain under an administration 
order for ever. Debt review can also be terminated in terms of section 86(10) 
of the NCA. In such an instance the debtor will no longer be under debt 
review but his debts will not be discharged and he will have to continue 
paying as per the original credit agreement or as per the terms of the set 
aside debt review order.  
The administration procedure is available to debtors whose debts do not 
exceed R50 000.43 Administration orders are granted by magistrates' courts 
to assist debtors in proceedings brought by those debtors who are not able 
to meet their financial obligations.44 Where a debtor has applied 
successfully for an administration order, an administrator is appointed to 
take control and manage the payment of debts due to creditors until all the 
listed creditors and administration costs are paid in full.45 The order usually 
requires the debtor to make regular payments to the administrator, who will, 
once all necessary expenses and determined remuneration, as per the tariff, 
                                            
38  Section 88 of the NCA; Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 
(SCA) 595. 
39  Section 8A of the Insolvency Act which was inserted by the National Credit 
Amendment Act 19 of 2014 (hereafter the National Credit Amendment Act). 
40  Investec Bank Ltd v Mutemeri 2010 1 SA 265 (GSJ) para 31; Naidoo v ABSA Bank 
2010 4 SA 597 (SCA); Otto National Credit Act Explained para 58. 
41  Section 71 of the NCA as amended by s 21 of the National Credit Amendment Act. 
Otto National Credit Act Explained para 11.4. For a detailed discussion of clearance 
certificates in terms of the NCA see Scholtz et al Guide to the National Credit Act 
para 11.4. 
42  A clearance certificate can be issued also if the debtor has demonstrated the 
financial ability to satisfy his future obligations in terms of the re-arranged order or 
that there are no arears on the re-arranged agreement. S 71 of the NCA read with 
reg 27 of the NCA Regulations; Circular 6 of 2017 Interpretation of Section 71 of the 
NCA paras 1-6. See NCR 2018 http://www.ncr.org.za and Otto National Credit Act 
Explained para 11.4. 
43  The debt amount is determined by the Minister (currently, of Justice) from time to 
time and is currently set at R50 000 (GN R1411 in GG 19434 of 30 October 1998).  
44  Paterson Eckard's Principles of Civil Procedure 318.  
45  See s 74U of the MCA. 
Z MABE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  8 
have been deducted, pay the creditors from the balance.46 A debtor who 
wants to apply for an administration order must have a steady income.47 
Debts that are payable by means of future instalments due in terms of an 
enforceable and existing contract,48 for example a mortgage agreement, are 
excluded from the administration order.49 
An administration order, like debt review, does not prevent the sequestration 
of the debtor's estate.50 The costs of the application for administration may 
be recovered from the first amounts received by the administrator from the 
debtor.51 The expenses and remuneration deductible by the administrator 
may usually not exceed 12.5% of the amount received from the debtor.52 As 
with debt review, the administration costs and administrator's fees 
unfortunately place an additional burden on a debtor's income, leaving less 
money available to distribute among the debtor's creditors.53 
An administration order terminates only when the costs of the administration 
and all the listed creditors of the debtor have been paid in full.54 When the 
costs of the administration and all the creditors recorded in the 
administration order have been fully paid, the administrator is obliged to 
lodge a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court, and send copies 
thereof to the debtor's creditors.55 There is no provision in the MCA that 
provides that the repayment of the debt must take place within a specific 
period of time, which means that many debtors may remain trapped by their 
debt.56 The intention of an administration order is to assist a debtor during 
a period of financial distress, and not to bind a debtor indefinitely. 
Regrettably it is the lack of any time limits linked to administration orders 
that undermine their intention.57 The administration procedure does not give 
                                            
46  Theophilopoulos, Van Heerden and Boraine Fundamental Principles of Civil 
Procedure 396. 
47  Fortuin v Various Creditors 2004 2 SA 570 (CPD) 575 (hereafter Fortuin v Various 
Creditors); Theophilopoulos, Van Heerden and Boraine Fundamental Principles of 
Civil Procedure 396. 
48  Greig 2000 SALJ 622. 
49  Section 74C(2) of the MCA; Fortuin v Various Creditors 746. 
50  Section 74R of the MCA; Shaban and Co (Pty) Ltd v Plank 1966 1 SA 59 (OPD) 59; 
Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms para 2.6. 
51  Section 74O of the MCA. 
52  Section 74L(2) of the MCA; African Bank Ltd v Weiner 2005 4 SA 363 (SCA) 373 
(hereafter African Bank Ltd v Weiner).  
53  African Bank Ltd v Weiner 367; Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms para 2.5.  
54  Section 74U of the MCA; Kelly-Louw 2008 SA Merc LJ 222. 
55  Section 74U of the MCA. 
56  Nel Analysis of the Legislative Mechanisms para 2.6. 
57  Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff 2012 De Jure 256, 265; African Bank Ltd v 
Jacobs 2006 3 SA 364 (CPD) 365; Ex parte August 2004 3 SA 268 (WLD) 271. 
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the debtor a discharge of his debts at any stage, which is a serious 
disadvantage of this procedure.58  
The sequestration process is designed to be to the benefit of the creditors 
of the debtor and to provide the debtor with a discharge of his debt. In 
contrast, both the administration process and the debt review process are 
designed specifically to assist over-indebted debtors to eventually settle 
their debt. 
4 Compositions under the South African insolvency law  
The South African insolvency law provides for two forms of compositions, 
namely common-law compositions and statutory compositions in terms of 
section 119 of the Insolvency Act.59 A common law compromise allows a 
debtor whose estate was provisionally sequestrated to avoid insolvency by 
entering into a compromise with his creditors.60 This type of compromise 
agreement is contractual and requires the approval of all the creditors to be 
binding.61 The advantage of a common law compromise is that once the 
agreement is approved the debtor will be released from his debts and any 
provisional order of sequestration will be discharged.62 The incentive for 
creditors is in receiving a higher dividend earlier than in sequestration and 
in saving on sequestration costs.63 However if one or more of the creditors 
fails to agree, the agreement falls away.64 
If a debtor's estate has been sequestrated finally, a statutory compromise 
gives a debtor a chance to avoid the liquidation process, obtain control of 
all or some of his assets and shorten the period of insolvency.65 A statutory 
composition requires an acceptance by creditors whose votes amount to 
not less than a three-fourths majority in value and a three-fourths majority 
                                            
58  Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff 2012 De Jure 254, 256; Kelly-Louw 2008 SA 
Merc LJ 222; Roestoff and Renke 2006 Obiter 99; Nel Analysis of the Legislative 
Mechanisms paras 2.6, 5.1. 
59  For a detailed discussion see Bertelsmann et al Mars ch 24. 
60  Mahomed v Lockhat Brothers & Co Ltd 1944 AD 230 241; Sharrock, Van der Linde 
and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law 203. 
61  Prinsloo v Van Zyl 1967 1 SA 581 (T) 583 (hereafter Prinsloo v Van Zyl); Kopman v 
Benjamin 1951 1 SA 882 (W); Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 13.2; Bertelsmann 
et al Mars para 24.2; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law 
para 18.1. 
62  Bertelsmann et al Mars para 24.1; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's 
Insolvency Law para 18.1. 
63  Bertelsmann et al Mars para 24.1. 
64  Bertelsmann et al Mars para 24.2. 
65  Bertelsmann et al Mars para 24.1; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's 
Insolvency Law 203. 
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in number of all proved creditors’ votes.66 The advantage of a statutory 
composition for the debtor is that it does not depend on the participation of 
all the creditors and the decision of the majority is binding.67 However, this 
form of compromise does not discharge the debts of the insolvent nor the 
sequestration order upon reaching the required majority.68 The insolvent 
remains unrehabilitated but can apply for early rehabilitation immediately 
after receiving a certificate from the Master of the acceptance of the offer of 
composition.69  
5 Bankruptcy in Kenya 
To initiate the alternatives to the bankruptcy procedures in the Kenyan 
Insolvency Act a debtor must be insolvent.70 It is therefore important to 
mention the requirements for entering the bankruptcy process in Kenya. A 
bankruptcy order can be awarded on application either by the debtor himself 
or by his creditors. In a debtor's application, the debtor must show that he 
is unable to pay his debts and his application for bankruptcy must be 
accompanied by a statement of his financial position.71 The court will not 
make the bankruptcy order if his financial statement is incorrect or 
incomplete. The court will also not make the order if it appears that, if the 
order is made, the total of the applicant's unsecured debts would be less 
than the small bankruptcy level72 and the value of the applicant's estate 
would be equal to or more than the minimum value.73 
In a creditor's application, the creditor must show that the debtor is unable 
to pay the debt74 or has no reasonable prospect of being able to pay the 
                                            
66  Section 119(7) of the Insolvency Act; Bertelsmann et al Mars para 24.5; Sharrock, 
Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law para 18.3. 
67  Bertelsmann et al Mars paras 24.1, 24.2. 
68  Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law 204. 
69  Sections 119(7), 124 of the Insolvency Act; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith 
Hockly's Insolvency Law para 18.4.5. 
70  See s 14 of the new Act. 
71  Section 32 of the new Act. 
72  In terms s 33 of the Kenyan Insolvency Act and reg 19(b) of the Kenyan Insolvency 
Regulations, 2016 the small bankruptcy level is 100 000 Kenyan shillings, which is 
equivalent to about R12 392 (conversion done through the currency converter found 
at Money Converter 2018 https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
73  In terms of s 33 of the Kenyan Insolvency Act and reg 19(a) of the Insolvency 
Regulations, 2016 the prescribed minimum value is 500 000 Kenyan shillings which 
is equivalent to around R61 947 (conversion done through the currency converter 
found at Money Converter 2018 https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
74  In order to show this requirement, the creditor must indicate that the amount of the 
debt was due and despite serving the debtor with a demand requiring payment of 
the debt, the debtor did not make payment. Section 17(3)(a) of the new Act. 
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debt.75 In addition, the creditor must prove that the debt is for a liquidated 
amount, it exceeds the bankruptcy level,76 and lastly there is no outstanding 
application to set aside a statutory demand in respect of the debt.77 A 
bankruptcy order will not be made unless these requirements are met.78  
5.1 Alternatives to bankruptcy under the new Insolvency Act 
Prior to the enactment of the new Insolvency Act in Kenya, the insolvency 
of natural persons was dealt with under the old Bankruptcy Act while 
corporate insolvency was dealt with under the winding-up provisions of the 
Companies Act. Like the South African Insolvency Act, the old Kenyan 
Bankruptcy Act also did not provide for alternatives to bankruptcy. The latter 
Act did, however, contain a provision on schemes of arrangement and 
compositions, under section 18. The acceptance of the proposal for a 
composition to satisfy his debts or a scheme of arrangement of his affairs 
with his creditors did not release any person who under the old Bankruptcy 
Act would not be released by an order of discharge, had the debtor been 
declared bankrupt.79 In terms of the old Bankruptcy Act there was no 
automatic discharge period. A bankrupt had to apply to the court for a 
discharge of debt and the court had the sole discretion to decide whether to 
discharge the bankrupt.80 
It is submitted that Kenya's new Insolvency Act, contrary to the old 
Bankruptcy Act, was drafted with an intention of meeting the needs not only 
of creditors but also of debtors, as envisaged by the World Bank Report. 
This can be seen in its preamble, which explains its purpose to include 
among other things: 
                                            
75  In order to show this requirement, the creditor must indicate that the amount of the 
debt was not immediately payable and despite serving the debtor with a demand 
requiring an establishment by the debtor to the satisfaction of the creditor that there 
is a reasonable prospect that he will be able to pay the debt, the debtor did not 
comply. Section 17(4) of the new Act. 
76  In terms of reg 3 of the Insolvency Regulations, 2016, the prescribed bankruptcy 
level is 250 000 shillings, which is equivalent to R30 926 depending on the exchange 
rate (conversion done through the currency converter found at Money Converter 
2018 https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
77  Section 17 of the new Act. 
78  Sections 25, 32 of the new Act.  
79  Section 18(20) of the old Bankruptcy Act of Kenya. 
80  Section 29 of the old Bankruptcy Act of Kenya. Considering the additional cost 
implication associated with making an application to an already overburdened 
bankrupt, it is submitted that this could have had the possibility of a bankrupt’s being 
bankrupt for life if he did not apply for bankruptcy. 
Z MABE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  12 
to provide for and to regulate the bankruptcy of natural persons; to provide 
alternative procedures to bankruptcy that will enable the affairs of insolvent 
natural persons to be managed for the benefit of their creditors; 
Furthermore, the new Insolvency Act also introduced debtor-friendly 
interventions such as an automatic discharge after three years from the date 
of lodgement of the statement of financial affairs, or earlier.81 These new 
alternatives to bankruptcy procedures provided for in section 14 of the new 
Act will be discussed next. 
5.2 Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVA) 
The Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVA) replaced the old compositions 
and schemes of arrangement contained in section 18 of the old Bankruptcy 
Act. With IVA a debtor who wants to make a proposal to his creditors makes 
an interim application to the court instead of to the Official Receiver (OR),82 
and the court has the power to order a meeting that convenes the creditors. 
If the debtor is an undischarged bankrupt, a notice must first be given to the 
OR before the interim application83 and the application may not be made 
while a bankruptcy application by the debtor is pending.84 While the interim 
application is pending, the court may prohibit the sale of the debtor's 
property and may stay any action, execution or other legal process against 
the property or person of the debtor.85 The proposal must provide for a 
person to be a supervisor of the voluntary arrangement.86 The court may 
grant an order to convene the creditors’ meeting in the view that it will help 
facilitate the consideration and implementation of the proposal.87 At the 
                                            
81  Sections 254, 258 of the new Act. 
82  Section 304 of the Kenyan Insolvency Act. In the old Bankruptcy Act, s 18 allowed a 
debtor who intended to make a proposal to submit such a proposal to the Official 
Receiver (OR) within four days of submitting his statement of affairs. 
83  Section 304(5) of the new Act. 
84  Section 304(6). To initiate the alternatives to the bankruptcy procedures in the new 
Act, a debtor must be insolvent. See s 14 of the new Act. 
85  Sections 305(1)(b) and 305(2) of the new Act. In addition, once the interim order is 
made, a bankruptcy application relating to the debtor may not be proceeded with. S 
306(7). 
86  Section 304(2). In terms of s 33(2)(b), the same insolvency practitioner who is 
appointed during the hearing of a debtor's application to prepare a report into the 
debtor's financial circumstances is used as a supervisor in an IVA application. 
87  Section 306(2) of the new Act. The court will make the order only if it is satisfied that 
on the day of making the application the debtor was an undischarged bankrupt or 
able to make an application for his own bankruptcy; that in the last 12 months no 
similar application had been made by the debtor, and that the supervisor enlisted is 
willing to act in relation to the proposal. S 306(1). 
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meeting of creditors, the proposal will be approved by a majority of votes in 
number and in value of the creditors present.88  
The court may order the approval of the proposal or any other order it deems 
fit, provided it is in the best interests of the debtor and creditors.89 The court 
may approve the proposal even though preferential and unsecured creditors 
have not approved, provided that it was approved by a majority of the 
secured creditors, it did not discriminate against dissenting groups, and 
preferential creditors’ interest were respected over unsecured creditors’ 
interests.90 
Once approved, the proposal becomes a voluntary arrangement and binds 
the debtor and creditors and the provisional supervisor becomes the 
supervisor of the arrangement.91 Approval dismisses any bankruptcy 
applications against the debtor that were pending or stayed.92 
5.3 Expedited procedure 
 The expedited procedures apply when an undischarged bankrupt wants to 
make a proposal for an IVA but an interim application has not been made 
to the court and the OR has been indicated as the supervisor in the 
proposal.93 After the debtor has provided the OR with the proposal and his 
statement of affairs94 and the OR is satisfied that the proposal has a 
reasonable prospect of approval, the OR arranges a meeting of creditors.95 
Soon after the creditors’ decision to approve or reject the proposal, the 
supervisor (OR) has to report to the court.96 If approved, the proposal 
becomes a voluntary arrangement and is binding on all creditors and the 
debtor.97 
 The OR may thereafter apply to the court for an annulment of the 
bankruptcy order, but such an application may not be made during the 
                                            
88  Section 311(2) of the new Act. 
89  Section 311(7) of the new Act. 
90  Section 311(8) of the new Act. 
91  Section 312 of the new Act. 
92  Section 312(7) of the new Act. 
93  Section 316(1) of the new Act. See fn 85 above on the effect of an interim order 
application. 
94  This requirement seems unnecessary, taking into account that the trustee of the 
bankrupt estate should already have the debtor's statement of affairs, unless they 
have changed.  
95  Section 316(3) of the new Act. 
96  Section 317 of the new Act. 
97  Section 318 of the new Act 
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period in which the arrangement may be challenged in court98 and unless 
there are compelling reasons not to do so.99 The court may direct the debtor 
to act in a manner that will facilitate the implementation of the voluntary 
arrangement100 but the court may revoke the arrangement if it unfairly 
affects creditors or if there is a material irregularity.101 
 It is regarded as criminal conduct for a debtor to make false, misleading 
representation, act fraudulently or omit to do any action for the purpose of 
obtaining approval of the voluntary arrangement.102 A guilty debtor is liable 
to a fine not exceeding two million shillings103 or to imprisonment of not 
more than five years.104 
5.4 Summary Instalment Order (SIO) 
A Summary Instalment Order (SIO) is an order from the OR, upon 
application by a debtor or creditor with the debtor's consent, directing a 
debtor to pay his debts in full or in instalments,105 in the manner prescribed 
by the insolvency regulations.106 In addition, the OR may make orders 
regarding the debtor's future income or the disposal of his assets.107 The 
OR may refuse the application if it is not satisfied that the application: 
 was made in the form prescribed by the insolvency regulations;  
 does not state that the debtor will make payment in full; 
 does not indicate the total number of instalments to be made weekly 
or monthly; 
 does not indicate the total earnings of the debtor;  
 does not indicate whether the debts are secured; and  
                                            
98  Section 318(3) of the new Act. 
99  Section 318(4) of the new Act. 
100  Section 319 (4) of the new Act. 
101  Section 320 of the new Act. 
102  Section 321(1) of the new Act. 
103  This is equivalent to about R246 277 (conversion done through the currency 
converter found at Money Converter 2018 
https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
104  Section 321(4) of the new Act. 
105  Sections 323, 324 of the new Act. 
106  Section 334 of the new Act. 
107  Sections 327, 327(c), 340 of the new Act. Such an order may also include an 
instruction to the supervisor to direct the debtor's employer to pay all or part of the 
debtor's income to the supervisor. 
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 does not indicate the name and address of the supervisor of the 
proposal. In such a case, the debtor will be required to provide reasons 
why a supervisor is not necessary.108  
The OR may make the order if it is satisfied that the debtor's total assets do 
not exceed five hundred thousand shillings, as prescribed by the insolvency 
regulations109 and that the debtor is unable to make payment 
immediately.110 However, the OR must first provide the creditors with an 
opportunity to make representation on the matter.111 An SIO is ineffective if 
it does not mention the appointment of a suitable and willing supervisor to 
ensure the debtor's compliance with the order.112 This is because the 
supervisor is responsible for ensuring the debtor's compliance with the 
orders made by the OR.113 For this service, the supervisor may charge 
remuneration provided that it does not exceed 7% of the value of the assets 
of the debtor that are recovered by the supervisor.114 The OR may omit the 
appointment of a supervisor if it deems it appropriate, however, and in such 
a case the debtor and the OR will act as supervisors.115  
An order made by the OR is effective for a maximum period of three years, 
unless on the existence of special circumstances and on acceptance by the 
supervisor the period is extended to five years.116 The debtor, creditor or 
supervisor may at any time apply to the OR to change or to discharge the 
SIO.117 The OR may order the cancellation of the SIO, however, should the 
debtor fail to make instalments in the prescribed manner.  
An SIO has the effect of preventing and staying all proceedings against a 
debtor in respect of his bankruptcy unless the debtor defaults payment or 
the OR approves.118 The supervisor must send out a notice of the SIO to 
                                            
108  Sections 324, 325(2) of the new Act. 
109  See reg 51 of the Insolvency Regulations, 2016. Five hundred thousand shillings is 
equivalent to R61 526 depending on the exchange rate. 
110  Section 326(1) of the new Act. 
111  Section 326(2) of the new Act. 
112  Section 328 of the new Act. 
113  Section 329 of the new Act. The role of the supervisor is so important that it is 
punishable by a fine or termination if the supervisor does not provide the OR with 
documents relating to the debtor’s conduct and administration of his estate within 7 
days of the notice to do so. 
114  Section 329(2) of the new Act; reg 69 of the Insolvency Regulations, 2016. 
115  Sections 328(2)-328(3) of the new Act. 
116  Section 332 of the new Act. 
117  Section 333 of the new Act. 
118  Section 335(2) of the new Act. 
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every proved creditor whose name appears on the debtor's application119 
and those creditors shall be included in the administration of the debtor's 
estate under the SIO.120 A creditor who proves a claim after the SIO has 
been made may elect to be included in the administration of the debtor's 
estate.121 However, such a creditor may be paid a dividend only after the 
earlier creditors have been paid.122  
A debtor who fails to pay amounts due under an SIO is presumed to have 
been able to pay that amount from the date of the order but to have 
neglected to pay. Should the debtor fail to pay, all stayed proceedings 
resume and the supervisor is required to notify the OR.123 A debtor who is 
the subject of a SIO commits an offence if he obtains credit of more than 
one hundred thousand shillings124 before all creditors have been paid, 
unless he has informed the credit provider that he was subject to a SIO.125 
Any debtor guilty of this offence is liable to a fine not exceeding one million 
shillings126 or to imprisonment of not more than twelve months or both.127 
5.5 The no asset procedure 
The no asset procedure provides a debtor with no realisable assets with an 
alternative to bankruptcy.128 A debtor may commence this procedure by 
making an application to the OR in the prescribed form, which requires a 
statement of the debtor's financial position.129 The application may be 
rejected if the statement is incorrect.130 
For the debtor’s application to succeed the OR must be satisfied that a 
debtor has no realisable assets,131 he has not been previously admitted to 
                                            
119  Section 336 of the new Act. The supervisor shall be liable to a fine should the notices 
not be sent, without reasonable excuse. 
120  Section 339 of the new Act. 
121  Section 339(4) of the new Act. 
122  Section 339(5) of the new Act. 
123  Section 341 of the new Act. 
124  This is equivalent to about R12 975 (conversion done through the currency converter 
found at Money Converter 2018 https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
125  Section 342 of the new Act. 
126  This is equivalent to about R129 975 (conversion done through the currency 
converter found at Money Converter 2018 https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/ 
KES.aspx). 
127   Section 342(3) of the new Act. 
128   Section 343 of the new Act. 
129  Section 344(2) of the new Act. 
130  Section 344(3) of the new Act. 
131  These assets do not include assets which the bankrupt is allowed to choose to keep 
as his own property in terms of s 161 of the new Act, which include among other 
things the bankrupt's necessary tools of trade, necessary household furniture and a 
motor vehicle. Realisable assets do include assets that may be recoverable by the 
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the procedure or been previously bankrupt, his total debts are not less than 
one hundred thousand shillings and not more than four million shillings,132 
and that he does not have the means to repay those debts.133 He may be 
disqualified, however, if he concealed assets with an intention to defraud 
his creditors and engaged in conduct that would amount to an offence if he 
were to be declared bankrupt. He would further be disqualified if he incurred 
a debt knowing that he did not have the means to repay it or if the OR is 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that a creditor intends to apply for the 
debtor to be declared bankrupt and it is likely that bankruptcy would result 
in a materially better outcome for the creditor, than the no-asset 
procedure.134 This disqualification appears contradictory to the main 
purpose of the no asset procedure, which is to provide an alternative to 
bankruptcy to debtors with no realisable assets. Secondly, if a debtor has 
no realisable assets, how can bankruptcy result in a materially better 
outcome for creditors than the no-asset procedure? 
As soon as the application is received, the OR must send a summary of the 
debtor's assets and liabilities to all known creditors.135 Making the 
application prohibits the debtor from obtaining credit of more than ten 
thousand shillings136 without first informing the credit provider of the no-
asset procedure application.137 A contravening debtor commits an offence 
punishable with a fine of not more than five hundred thousand shillings138 or 
to imprisonment of not more than six months.139 Taking into account the 
circumstances of the debtor under the no-asset procedure, it is submitted 
that the debtor should be completely prohibited from making more debt 
upon making the application. 
On the debtor’s admission to the procedure, the OR will send a notice to the 
debtor and each creditor and will publish the notice in the prescribed 
                                            
OR (such as gifted assets), however, if the debtor were to be declared bankrupt on 
the date of application for entry to the no asset procedure. S 345(2) of the new Act. 
132  Not less than about R12 312 but not more than R519 012 (conversions done through 
the currency converter found at Money Converter 2018 
https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
133  Section 345 of the new Act. 
134  Section 346 of the new Act. 
135  Section 347 of the new Act. 
136  This is equivalent to about R1 283 (conversion done through the currency converter 
found at Money Converter 2018 https://themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
137  Section 348 of the new Act. 
138  This is equivalent to about R62, 405 (conversion done through the currency 
converter found at Money Converter 2018 https://the 
moneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
139   Section 348(2) of the new Act. 
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manner.140 On the debtor’s admission, his creditors are prohibited from 
enforcing debts against the debtor that were owed to the creditor at the time 
the debtor applied for the no-asset procedure and which would be a 
provable debt if the debtor would be declared bankrupt.141 Certain debts, 
however, remain enforceable.142 The debtor is also prohibited upon 
admission from obtaining credit of more than one hundred thousand 
shillings143 from a credit provider without informing the provider and is 
punishable in such an event with a fine of one million shilling144 or 
imprisonment of not exceeding 12 months or to both.145 
The no-asset procedure commences from the date of admission. Thereafter 
the debtor’s debts (except excluded debts)146 are automatically discharged 
after twelve months, unless the period is extended for a period not 
exceeding 35 days after the end of the twelve-month period.147 Once 
discharged, the debts that became unenforceable are cancelled and the 
debtor is no longer required to pay any part of the debts, including penalties 
and interests that may have accrued.148 This does not apply, however, to 
debts incurred fraudulently.149 Participation in the procedure may also be 
terminated earlier, either by the OR150 by a creditor151 or by a debtor 
                                            
140  Section 349 of the new Act. 
141  Section 351(1) of the new Act. 
142  Debts that remain enforceable include amounts payable under a court order made 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap 152 of the Laws of Kenya) (hereafter 
Matrimonial Causes Act), amounts payable under the Children Act (Cap 8 of the 
Laws of Kenya) (hereafter Children Act) and amounts owed in respect of a loan to 
secure the education of a dependent child or step-child of the debtor. S 351(2) of the 
new Act. 
143  This is equivalent to about R12, 481 (conversion done through the currency 
converter found at Money Converter 2018 https://themoney 
converter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
144  This is equivalent to about R124, 810 (conversion done through the currency 
converter found at Money Converter 2018 https:// 
themoneyconverter.com/ZAR/KES.aspx). 
145  The debtor can use the fact that the credit provider was aware of the no-asset 
procedure, as a defence. S 353 of the new Act. 
146  Debts that remain enforceable include amounts payable under a court order made 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act, amounts payable under the Children Act and 
amounts owed in respect of a loan to secure the education of a dependent child or 
step-child of the debtor. S 351(2) of the new Act. 
147  Section 359(1) of the new Act. The s 359 discharge does not release a debtor's 
business partners and others. S 361 of the new Act. 
148  Section 360 of the new Act. 
149  Those debts incur similar effects to termination of the procedure by the OR. Section 
360(2) of the new Act. 
150  The OR may terminate the procedure where a debtor was wrongly admitted (the 
debtor concealed assets) or where the debtor's financial circumstances have 
changed. See s 355 of the new Act. 
151  A creditor may apply for the termination of the debtor's participation on the grounds 
that the debtor did not meet the criteria for admission or that there are reasonable 
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applying for his own bankruptcy,152 or by a creditor's application for the 
debtor's bankruptcy.153 Upon early termination, the debtor's debts become 
enforceable and he becomes liable to pay any penalties and interest that 
may have accrued.154 
6 Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, this article seeks to answer the question whether the 
current alternatives available in South Africa to the sequestration process 
allow debtors in different financial positions to obtain a discharge. The first 
investigation was whether the alternatives available in South Africa to the 
sequestration processes provide debtors in different financial positions with 
a discharge of debts. 
In South Africa only applicants who are able to show that sequestration will 
be to the benefit of creditors can access the sequestration process.155 If they 
are unable to meet this requirement, sequestration will not be possible and 
debtors, depending on their situation and the debts involved, can make use 
of debt review in terms of the NCA or administration orders in terms of the 
MCA. Due to the different nature of the debts governed by each of these 
two mechanisms, the same debtor may be under debt review and 
administration simultaneously. However, both debt review and 
administration orders do not provide for a discharge of debt. They provide 
for debt restructuring only, in order to eventually satisfy creditors' claims. 
The cost implications156 of debt review and the fact that it applies only to 
credit agreements falling within the scope of the NCA limit its suitability to 
                                            
grounds for the OR to conclude that the debtor can be disqualified. Ss 354(d), 358 
of the new Act. 
152  Section 354(c) of the new Act. 
153  Creditors who can apply for a debtor's bankruptcy include those creditors whose 
debts remain enforceable under s 351(2) of the new Act. See fn 138 and 142 above. 
154  This does not occur if the no asset procedure is terminated by a discharge under s 
359 of the new Act. S 357(2) of the new Act. 
155  Evans suggests that the advantage requirement distinguishes between rich and poor 
debtors since only rich debtors can show sufficient assets to pay for the costs of 
sequestration. As one can be too poor to be declared insolvent in South Africa, poor 
debtors are excluded from the sequestration procedure and the eventual discharge 
of their debts. Coetzee further explains this by indicating that the advantage 
requirement separates those debtors who can access the sequestration process 
from those who cannot, and ultimately makes obtaining debt relief to no income and 
no assets (NINA) debtors difficult. See Evans 2002 IIR 34; Rochelle 1996 TSAR 319; 
Coetzee Comparative Reappraisal of Debt Relief Measures 9; Mabe 2017 THRHR 
695. 
156  The debt re-arrangement plan must be viable. See Seyffert v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a 
First National Bank 2012 6 SA 581 (SCA) para 13; Roestoff and Coetzee 2012 SA 
Merc LJ 68. 
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certain debtors. Administration orders are also not a favourite because they 
are also available only to debtors whose creditor's claims do not exceed 
R50 000, and they may also be expensive, taking into account the fact that 
the administration will pay creditors only after all the necessary expenses 
and determined remuneration have been deducted. 
If the sequestration process has already commenced, South African debtors 
may enter into a compromise with their creditors. Although the common-law 
compromise releases the debtor from his debts and discharges any 
provisional order of sequestration, it requires a buy-in by all the creditors, 
which may be difficult to attain. The statutory compromise, on the other 
hand, does not discharge the sequestration order or debts, although the 
debtor may apply for early rehabilitation after receiving a certificate from the 
Master of the acceptance of the offer of composition.157 
If the debt intervention in the Draft Bill is implemented in a future National 
Credit Amendment Act it may provide an alternative to the sequestration 
process that provides for a discharge of debts. However, it would still apply 
to certain debtors158 and, like administration orders, exclude the group of 
debtors with debts above R50 000. Like debt review, debtors whose debts 
did not arise from a credit agreement would also be excluded. A debtor who 
seeks a discharge of debts and who cannot meet the advantage 
requirement for a sequestration order would be in the same position with or 
without the debt intervention process in the Draft Bill.  
The Kenyan Insolvency Act does not have a requirement equivalent to the 
South African requirement that the sequestration will be to the benefit of 
creditors. Instead, in Kenya a bankruptcy order will be awarded if it is 
shown159 or appears to be shown that a debtor is unable to pay his debts or 
has no reasonable prospect of being able to pay his debts.160 Further, a 
Court in Kenya will not give a bankruptcy order if in a debtor's application it 
will reduce the value of the applicant's unsecured debts to less than R12 
392161 and the value of the applicant's estate would be equal or more than 
                                            
157  Section 124(1) of the Insolvency Act. 
158  See fn 151 above, where Evans makes a distinction between poor debtors and rich 
debtors and explains that in South Africa poor debtors are excluded from the 
sequestration procedure and the eventual discharge of their debts. Likewise the debt 
intervention in the Draft Bill and administration orders applies only to poor debtors 
but excludes debtors who are not poor enough because their debts are above R50 
000 (the poor and the not poor enough). 
159  This requirement is for a debtor's application. S 31 of the new Act. 
160  This requirement is for a creditor's application. S 17 of the new Act. 
161  Which is the small bankruptcy level in Kenya. S 33 of the Kenyan Insolvency Act; 
reg 19 of the Insolvency Regulations, 2016. 
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R61 947162 and in a creditor's application the debt is less than R30 926.163 
This appears to mean that if in a bankruptcy initiated by a debtor, bankruptcy 
will result in a debtor's debts being less than the small bankruptcy amount 
of R12 392 and his assets being equal to or more or less than the minimum 
amount of R61 947, such a debtors' application will be dismissed and such 
a debtor will not be able to access the bankruptcy procedure. If this is 
correct, it would also mean that if a debtor's debts are less than the 
bankruptcy level of R30 926 a creditor will not apply for such a debtor's 
bankruptcy. Consequently, such a debtor will not be able to benefit from the 
discharge of debts that bankruptcy eventually provides on rehabilitation. 
This puts such a debtor in the same position as the South African debtor 
who is unable to show a benefit to creditors. Unlike the South African debtor, 
however, the Kenyan debtor has some incentives. Firstly, his debts will 
automatically be discharged after three years of lodging his statement of 
financial affairs. Secondly, he can also make use of one of the alternatives 
to bankruptcy procedures provided by the new Act,164 where applicable, 
which are absent from the South African Insolvency Act. Despite the 
automatic discharge after three years incentive, the Kenyan Insolvency Act 
does not appear to have a requirement or process that will curb desperate 
debtors who may want to use fraudulent165 means to access the bankruptcy 
process to eventually obtain automatic discharge after three years. 
The question that begs an answer now is whether the alternatives to the 
bankruptcy procedures in the Kenyan Insolvency Act really provide an 
alternative to bankruptcy that provides for a discharge of the debts of 
debtors with small debts and small assets and debtors with big debts but 
with small assets. Or do they provide an alternative that only suspends or 
postpones bankruptcy but not necessarily an alternative that leads to a 
discharge of debts. As already mentioned, Kenya introduced a wide range 
of alternatives to the bankruptcy procedure, which at face value appear to 
achieve this purpose. As indicated, these include the IVA, the expedited 
procedure, the SIO and the no asset procedure. 
                                            
162  Which is the minimum value. See s 33 of the Kenyan Insolvency Act; reg 19 of the 
Insolvency Regulations, 2016. 
163  Which is the bankruptcy level. See reg 3 of the Insolvency Regulations, 2016. 
164  Section 33(1)(d) read with s 34(2) of the new Act, which provides that a court will not 
make a bankruptcy order if it appears that it would be necessary to appoint an 
insolvency practitioner to prepare a proposal for a voluntary arrangement. 
165  That may include debtors who deliberately incur debts in order to obtain the 
discharge. 
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6.1 The IVA  
Although the IVA replaced the schemes of arrangement and compositions 
under section 18 of the old Kenyan Bankruptcy Act, it is submitted that the 
IVA is not a new procedure but an improvement of the section 18 schemes 
of arrangement and compositions. With the section 18 procedures, a three-
fourths majority in number and in value was required for acceptance of the 
proposal by creditors who had proved their claims, before approval by the 
court. The IVA, on the other hand, requires a majority of votes in number 
and in value of the creditors present before approval. With an IVA the court 
will grant an order to convene a creditors’ meeting only if it will help facilitate 
the consideration and implementation of the proposal; and in approving the 
proposal, the court will consider the interest of the debtor and creditors. 
However, while section 18(20) of the old Bankruptcy Act explicitly indicated 
that it did not release any person from his debts who could not be released 
by an order of discharge, the new Act does not mention the release of the 
debtor from his debts; only, that pending or stayed bankruptcy applications 
are dismissed.166 It appears, then, that although the court may approve an 
IVA and make any order it deems fit, taking account the interest of the debtor 
and creditors, the approval still does not provide the debtor with a discharge 
of his debts. It leads only to the dismissal of bankruptcy applications.  
The outcome of the IVA is similar to those of both the South African common 
law compromise and the South African statutory compromise, however. Like 
the common law compromise, the IVA releases the debtor from any 
bankruptcy applications and the debtor is therefore able to avoid the 
bankruptcy procedure and its costs.167 Like the common law compromise,168 
a creditor may still challenge the decision to approve the proposal, and in 
such a case the court may revoke the approval.169 
The IVA is also similar to the statutory compromise in that it appears that it 
does not discharge the debtor from the debt itself. The debtor has to pay his 
debt according to the voluntary arrangement, under supervision.170 If the 
debt amount has not been paid at the end of the arrangement, the Kenyan 
                                            
166  Section 312(7) of the new Act. 
167  Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law 203, s 312(7) of the 
Kenyan Insolvency Act. 
168  With the common law compromise, a dissenting creditor may still apply for the 
sequestration of the debtor's estate and nullify the effect of the agreement. See 
Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law para 18.1; Prinsloo v 
Van Zyl 583. 
169  Section 314(4) of the Kenyan Insolvency Act. 
170  Sections 312(3), 315 of the new Act. 
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Insolvency Act provides that the debtor will then become liable for the 
outstanding amount, payable to that specific creditor.171 
6.2 The expedited procedure 
The expedited procedure appears to be an accelerated IVA, except that the 
meeting of creditors is instead arranged by the supervisor (OR).172 It 
appears, however, that this procedure is stricter than the IVA because if the 
proposal is accepted by the creditors and approved by the court, pending or 
stayed bankruptcy applications are not dismissed automatically as is the 
case with IVA. Instead, an application may be made by the OR to annul the 
bankruptcy order. Further, the IVA has heavy sanctions for committing 
fraudulent actions in order to obtain approval of the voluntary 
arrangement.173 Like the IVA, the expedited procedure does not provide for 
the discharge of debts. 
6.3 The SIO 
The SIO is similar to both the South African NCA's debt review process and 
the magistrates' court administration order. Like debt review, the SIO is an 
order instructing the debtor to pay his debts in instalments. The SIO requires 
that the instalments be paid in the manner prescribed by the Insolvency 
Regulations174 and that the OR must provide creditors with an opportunity 
to make representations before making the order. The OR is also allowed 
to make other orders.175 With debt review, the court grants orders only in 
accordance with the terms of the debt counsellor's recommendations, and 
as permitted by the NCA.176  
A SIO does not discharge debts, but unlike debt review, which only 
postpones debt enforcement and does not protect a debtor from 
sequestration applications, a SIO suspends proceedings against the debtor 
but also suspends bankruptcy applications against the debtor.177 A SIO may 
be discharged, changed or cancelled on application by the debtor, creditor 
                                            
171  Section 312(4) of the new Act. 
172  In the expedited procedure, the OR is appointed as the supervisor. 
173  A guilty debtor is liable to a fine not exceeding R259 506 or to imprisonment of not 
more than five years. S 321(4) of the new Act.  
174  Such regulations include amongst others that payment to creditors must be made 
every four months, unless the SIO provides otherwise. See regs 52(2) and 71 of the 
Insolvency Regulations, 2016. 
175  Section 327 of the new Act. 
176  Section 86(7)(c) of the NCA, for the recommendations that the debt counsellor may 
request the Magistrate’s Court. 
177  All suspended proceedings resume however, should the debtor fail to make 
payments. See s 335(2) of the new Act. 
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or supervisor, but generally it is effective for a maximum period of three 
years, unless extended to five years.178  
Whereas debt review prevents a debtor under debt review from entering 
into any new credit agreements, except as permitted by the NCA, a debtor 
who is the subject of a SIO is only prohibited from obtaining credit of more 
than R12 975. If the debtor informed a credit provider before getting credit 
above the credit limit that he is the subject of a SIO, the debtor would not 
have committed an offence.179 
In debt review the supervisor in a SIO, like a debt counsellor, is permitted 
to receive remuneration.180 However, the OR may decide not to appoint a 
supervisor where necessary and thereby save on supervisor costs, while 
the appointment of a debt counsellor is not optional. It is submitted that 
saving costs is important, taking into account the fact that a SIO is granted 
to debtors who have assets valued below R61 526.  
Debt review, administration orders181 and SIOs are all expensive, but with 
debt review there is no monetary limit on the total outstanding debt or the 
debtor's total number of assets for a debtor to apply for debt review. In this 
respect, debt review appears better. At the crux of debt review, however, is 
the fact that it must be possible to re-arrange the debt, the debtor must have 
a steady income, and it applies to credit agreements only, whereas SIO 
applies to all types of agreements. 
Even though the proposed debt interventions in the Draft Bill provide for the 
discharge of debt for certain debtors, like debt review they can be accessed 
only by debtors whose debts arose from credit agreements, and the 
applicant’s debt must not be more than R50 000. This is similar to a South 
African administration order, which is available to debtors whose claims do 
not exceed R50 000 only, and to the SIO, which is available to debtors 
whose total assets do not exceed R61 526 only. This limitation leaves those 
                                            
178  Section 332 of the new Act. 
179  Any debtor guilty of this offence is liable to a fine not exceeding one million shillings 
(122 976, 36) or to imprisonment of not more than twelve months or both.  
180  The remuneration must not be more than 7% of the debtor's assets recovered by the 
supervisor. See s 329(2) of the new Act and reg 69 of the Insolvency Regulations, 
2016. 
181  Only once the necessary expenses have been paid will the administrator pay 
creditors. See para 3 of this article. 
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debtors who cannot meet these monetary limits without an alternative to 
bankruptcy.182 
6.4 The no asset procedure 
The no asset procedure could be the true alternative to the bankruptcy 
procedure for debtors who fall outside the bankruptcy requirements. To 
participate, a debtor must show that he has no realisable assets, his debts 
are between R12 975 and R519 012, and he has no means to pay those 
debts. On his admission to the procedure, his creditors cannot enforce their 
claims nor apply for the debtor's bankruptcy, and upon his discharge after 
12 months from admission, all his debts are discharged including all accrued 
penalties.183 This comes at a high price, however, because there are harsh 
penalties for debtors who contravene the prohibitions.184 The penalties 
become even heavier for debtors who obtain credit on admission to the 
procedure.185 In addition, if the procedure is terminated earlier as a result of 
fraudulent actions by the debtor or because of a bankruptcy application by 
a debtor or a bankruptcy application by a creditor whose debts remain 
enforceable as specified in section 351(2)186 of the new Act, all the debtor's 
debts become enforceable, including any penalties and interests that may 
have accrued.187 
In South African law there is no procedure that provides a discharge to 
debtors with no assets and who have debts above R50 000. The debt 
intervention in the Draft Bill, as indicated, applies to certain debtors only. In 
an attempt to allow debtors in all financial positions to become economically 
capable through a discharge, South African lawmakers should consider 
including an intervention similar to the Kenyan no-asset procedure in the 
Insolvency Act. Unlike the Kenyan no asset procedure, however, the South 
African procedure should prohibit a debtor who has been admitted to the 
process from obtaining more credit altogether, and not only where the 
                                            
182  However, these debtors can apply to participate in the no asset procedure if they 
can show that they have no realisable assets. See para 5.5 in this paper. 
183  This does not apply to debts incurred fraudulently. 
184  The debtor is prohibited from getting credit of more than R1 283 when he makes the 
application. The offence is punishable with a fine of more than R62,405 or to 
imprisonment of more than six months. S 348 of the new Act. 
185  The debtor is prohibited from getting credit of more than R12,481 on admission to 
the procedure. The offence is punishable with a fine of more than R124,810 or to 
imprisonment of not exceeding twelve months or both. S 353 of the new Act. 
186  Debts that remain enforceable include amounts payable under a court order made 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act, amounts payable under the Children Act and 
amounts owed in respect of a loan to secure the education of a dependent child or 
step-child of the debtor. S 351(2) of the new Act. 
187  Section 357 of the new Act. 
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debtor has not informed the credit provider. The penalty for contravening 
such a prohibition should be more stringent, to serve as a deterrent. 
Lastly, a debtor should not be disqualified from admission into the process 
because it appears that a creditor intends to apply for the debtor to be 
declared bankrupt. The aim of the no asset procedure is to avoid 
bankruptcy. Secondly a debtor who is a candidate for the procedure would 
not be a good candidate for bankruptcy, because he has no realisable 
assets which could benefit creditors.  
7 A few closing comments 
Alternatives to the sequestration process in South Africa should ideally curb 
the abuse of the sequestration process created by the advantage 
requirement; provide all debtors with opportunities to pay their creditors in 
an incentivised manner with the hope of discharge; release certain debtors 
from their responsibilities earlier; and provide them with a last chance of 
escaping the sequestration process and avoiding the stigma that 
accompanies insolvency.  
The South African alternatives to sequestration clearly do not provide for a 
discharge of debts and dismissal (or even avoidance) of insolvency 
proceedings. Although the Kenyan bankruptcy procedure also excludes 
certain debtors from the procedure, an important lesson to be learned from 
the Kenyan insolvency system is that it provides debtors with the option of 
applying for one of the alternatives to bankruptcy procedures provided by 
the new Act itself.188 It is submitted that mentioning the alternatives as early 
as section 14 in the new Act gives the impression that the lawmakers 
wanted debtors to first be aware of these alternatives before even 
considering the bankruptcy application in sections 17 and 32 of the new Act, 
thereby educating debtors about other ways of obtaining a discharge 
outside of bankruptcy. 
Although some of the alternatives, namely the IVA and the expedited 
procedure, do not provide a discharge on the approval of the proposal, 
stayed and pending bankruptcies are dismissed. A debtor is therefore able 
to avoid bankruptcy, its costs and the stigma associated with bankruptcy. 
While debt review is intended to allow over-indebted debtors to obtain relief 
from their over-indebtedness while still meeting their financial obligations 
with the aim of eventually settling their debts, this purpose appears to be 
                                            
188  The alternatives to bankruptcy are mentioned in s 14 of the new Act before the 
requirements and procedure for bankruptcy in ss 17, 32 of the new Act.  
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defeated if sequestration applications can still be made. It is therefore 
submitted that the debt review procedure should be amended to permit a 
debtor to at least be able to avoid sequestration applications during its 
existence.189 
The SIO also does not discharge debts during the existence of the order but 
it suspends all proceedings against the debtor, including bankruptcy 
proceedings. Its biggest advantage is that it has a determined period of 
expiration: three years extended to a maximum period of five years. This 
excuses the debtor from having to pay the instalments for years. To cater 
for debtors who are unable to make weekly or monthly payments, an 
arrangement can be made that the instalment be payable every four 
months.190 To reduce the costs of the procedure, the requirement of a 
supervisor can be dispensed with, and a debtor can still obtain credit of not 
more than R12 975. Although in Kenya an SIO is essentially effective for 
the same period as bankruptcy, it is a better alternative than bankruptcy 
because if successful, debts are paid in full in three years, it avoids 
bankruptcy and the stigma associated with it, and it may have reduced 
costs. Be that as it may, the debtor may lose some of his assets if the OR 
makes an order regarding the disposal of assets.191 
In South Africa the no asset procedure could be the true alternative to the 
sequestration procedure. It caters for debtors who have no realisable assets 
but who have debts between R12 975 and R519 012.192 It suspends all 
claims against a debtor, including bankruptcy applications. After twelve 
months from admission, the debtor is discharged from all his debts, 
including any penalties that may have accrued. The debtor is therefore 
released from his debts earlier than in bankruptcy, and the debtor avoids 
bankruptcy completely. In order to advance the re-establishment of a 
debtor's economic capability, as purposed by the World Bank Report, it is 
submitted that the South African law makers should consider the 
alternatives to bankruptcy provisions in the Kenyan Insolvency Act. A debt 
intervention process should ideally provide a discharge and apply to all 
debtors (including those with no assets and debts above R50 000) and to 
all agreements. As the Insolvency Act is the only legislation that provides a 
                                            
189  Section 86(10) of the NCA allows for the termination of debt review should the 
consumer be in default. 
190  See regs 52(2), 71 of the Insolvency Regulations, 2016. 
191  Section 327 of the new Act. 
192  It would be the legislature's prerogative to determine the amounts that would appear 
suitable for South African debtors who fall outside the scope of the sequestration 
process, debt review and administration in terms of the MCA. 
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process that discharges debts upon rehabilitation, such a debt intervention 
should ideally be included in the Insolvency Act and preferably before the 
voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration processes are 
explained. That would hopefully make consumers aware of such debt 
intervention before considering the sequestration process. 
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